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WELCOME & INTRODUCTION
DEAN TREANOR:1 Good evening. FIam Bill Treanor, the Dean
of Fordham Law School, and it is my pleasure to welcome you tonight
to the Fifth Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities
& Financial Law.
Fordham Law School, with the support of Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius, inaugurated the A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture Series in the fall of
2000 with the timely insights of the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (the "SEC" or the "Commission") then-Chair Arthur
Leavitt.2 Since then, the Sommer Lecture has continued to bring to
Fordham such heavyweights as Mary Schapiro,3 President of National
. Richard G. Ketchum delivered this address at Fordham University School of Law on
November 9, 2004. It has been edited to remove the minor cadences of speech that
appear awkward in writing and to identify significant sources when referred to by the
speakers.
** Richard G. Ketchum was appointed Chief Regulatory Officer of the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") on January 8, 2004. From June 2003 until his appointment, Mr.
Ketchum was the General Counsel of the Corporate and Invesment Bank of Citigroup,
Inc. He also spent twelve years at the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
("NASD") where he was president of NASDAQ for three years and of the NASD for
seven years. Prior to that he spent fourteen years at the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), where he was Director of Market Regulation for eight years.
1. William Michael Treanor is the Dean of the Fordham University School of
Law.
2. Hon. Arthur Levitt, Jr., The First Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr., Lecture on
Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, Inagural Address: Costs Paid with Other
People's Money, 6 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 259 (2001).
3. Mary L. Schapiro, The Second Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr., Lecture on
Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, The Regulation of the Securities Industry in the
Wake of the 9/11 Tragedy, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5 (2001).
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Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") Regulation, Inc., SEC
Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid,4 and last year William McDonough
of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.5
Tonight we continue this great tradition with one of the most
influential figures in the brave new world of corporate accountability. It
is my great honor to welcome Richard G. Ketchum, who in eight brief
months as Chief Regulatory Officer of the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE" or "Exchange") has made important strides in restoring
confidence in the world's largest equity market.
In addition to his important work at the NYSE, Rick is also a
member of the Board of Advisors of Fordham Center for Corporate,
Securities and Financial Law (the "Center"),6 and an adjunct faculty
member. We are pleased to call him a true friend of the Center and are
grateful for his generosity of time and expertise.
The growing dialogue on corporate law and governance through the
Sommer Lecture cemented the creation of the Center. Under the
direction of Professor Jill Fisch, with the assistance of Professor
Caroline Gentile, the Center has grown along with this lecture series
over the past four years, continually shedding new light on an
increasingly complex corporate environment.
I would like to recognize Professor Fisch, Professor Gentile, and
Beth Young, for all their work in putting together this evening's lecture.
Thank you, all.
They have also been working diligently to orchestrate the upcoming
Albert A. DeStefano Lecture, and it is my pleasure to announce to you
that New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer will deliver that
address here on April 11, 2005. We will continue to share details with
you about this event and other Center events that continue to further the
discussion on issues that affect us all.
Now I am honored to introduce a dedicated alumnus and great
friend of Fordham Law School, a man whose remarkable commitment to
4. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Third Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr., Lecture on
Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, Post-Enron America: An SEC Perspective, 8
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 335 (2003).
5. See William J. McDonough, The Fourth Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr., Lecture on
Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 587 (2004).
6. For more information on the Fordham Center for Corporate, Securities and
Financial Law, visit http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/fisch/source.html (last visited
April 27, 2005).
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the vision of the Center is a large part of the reason we are here tonight.
John Peloso is Senior Counsel at Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, which is
the same firm where Mr. Sommer practiced. In fact, Mr. Sommer
recruited John Peloso to work there. So it is particularly appropriate to
turn matters over to him at this point.
John has been instrumental both in creating this lecture series and
increasing the profile and work of the Center. All of us at Fordham Law
School, and all of us at Fordham University, are profoundly in his debt.
It is my pleasure to introduce to you John Peloso.
MR. PELOSO: 7 Good evening, everybody.
My role here this evening is simply on behalf of Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius to welcome you to this Fifth Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture.
As most of you know, the lecture series was established five years ago
by Morgan, Lewis as a way of interacting with Fordham Law School to
stimulate the study of corporate and securities law and as a way of jump-
starting the Center here at the Law School.
We thought a good way to do that was to identify this lecture in the
name of our partner who was most identified with the securities world.
Al Sommer was a partner at Morgan, Lewis for many years before
retiring in 1994. He was a practicing corporate lawyer for most of his
career, but took time out to become a distinguished member of the SEC.
He was very active in professional organizations, particularly with the
accounting industry. He was an adjunct professor at a number of law
schools. He was a prolific commentator-the recipient of many awards,
too numerous to mention, particularly from the accounting industry.
He came to Morgan, Lewis in 1979 to develop a securities
regulatory practice. He spearheaded the building of that practice lawyer
by lawyer, so that today we think it is one of the finest in the country.
This being 2004, tonight we are celebrating the twenty-fifth
anniversary of the establishment of that practice by Al and others at the
firm, and so we have brought together people from around the country
who are members of our firm, and also alumni, in order to celebrate the
event. The response was so enthusiastic that we are thinking of making
7. John F.X. Peloso is senior counsel in the litigation practice of Morgan, Lewis &
Bockius LLP as well as an Adjunct Professor of Law at the Fordham University School
of Law. His practice has focused on all aspects of securities litigation, broker-dealer
matters, and enforcement and disciplinary proceedings before the SEC, the NYSE and
other self-regulatory organizations.
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it an annual affair. We will let you know more about that later.
Al Sommer was with us for the first two lectures to introduce the
speaker. Three years ago he passed away, after battling a deadly illness,
but he is represented here this evening by his lovely wife Starr and his
daughter Susan. They have been at all of these lectures and are our most
loyal participants.
In a way, I think Al will always be with us for this event because
the lecture is meant to stand as a monument to him as one of the great
lawyers of our generation.
It is now my pleasure to introduce to you Professor Jill Fisch, who,
as the Dean pointed out to you, is the Director of the Center. She is also
the Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law and is highly regarded, often
quoted, and considered to be one of the really up and coming major
players in this part of the world.
PROF. FISCH:8 Good evening. I am Jill Fisch and I am Director
of the Fordham Center for Corporate, Securities and Financial Law. On
behalf of the Fordham Law School community I welcome you to the
Fifth Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture.
I would like to express Fordham's deep gratitude to the firm of
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius for their generosity in establishing the
Lecture. Additionally, because in 2004 we are commemorating the
seventieth anniversary of the SEC, we have the honor of having the SEC
Historical Society9 join us as well.
I would like to thank Richard Ketchum for agreeing to deliver this
year's lecture. I would also like to add my welcome to Starr and to
Susan. I am delighted that you are here.
As you know, we consider the Sommer Lecture to be one of the real
gems of the business program at the Law School. We have been lucky
in being able to identify and to attract speakers who are at the highest
levels of leadership in the profession. We here at Fordham have
benefited from their insights into some of the most significant events
affecting the business community. Of course, this year's speaker is no
exception.
The Sommer Lecture is part of the Fordham program in corporate
8. Jill E. Fisch is the Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law at the Fordham
University School of Law and is the Director of the Fordham Center for Corporate,
Securities and Financial Law.
9. More information available at http://www.sechistorical.org.
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and securities law, a program that with the formation of the Center has
continued to grow in quality and prominence. The program builds on
Fordham's strong business law faculty, including an unparalleled
adjunct faculty, and you have already heard that Rick Ketchum is a
member of that faculty.
We also have the Securities Arbitration Clinic' ° in which our
students represent small investors who lose money investing in the stock
market--hard to see how that could happen.
[Laughter.]
We have a remarkable alumni base, which includes top leaders in
the field of business law, many of whom are here tonight.
And we have a specialized business law journal, the Fordham
Journal of Corporate & Financial Law. Many of the student editors and
staff members are here in the audience. And, as with previous lectures,
tonight's lecture will be published in that journal.
The predecessor to the NYSE was formed by a group of twenty-
four stockbrokers in 1792 with the signing of the infamous Buttonwood
Agreement." The pact was referred to as the Buttonwood Agreement
because it was supposedly signed beneath a buttonwood tree outside 68
Wall Street, where brokers often met in good weather to carry on their
trading. The agreement established the NYSE as a self-regulatory
organization ("SRO") controlled by its membership, and the contract
remains largely intact through today.
The concept of what it means to be an SRO, and how such
organizations should function and be regulated, is currently a hot topic.
Last spring, the Center hosted a panel discussion at the Albert A.
DeStefano Lecture'" where participants from the SEC, the NYSE, and
10. See generally http://law.fordham.edu/clinics.htm (for information about
Fordham University School of Law's clinical legal education programs).
11. Stuart Banner, The Origin of The New York Stock Exchange 1791-1860, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 113 (1998); see also William I. Friedman, The Fourteenth Amendment's
Public/Private Distinction Among Securities Regulators in the U.S. Marketplace -
Revisited, 23 ANN. REv. BANKING & FIN. L. 727, 738 n.50 (2004), (discussing the
history and formation of the NYSE in regulating U.S. securities markets). For a full
text of the agreement see, Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exchange Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 663
(1975).
12. See The Fifth Annual Albert A. DeStefano Lecture on Corporate, Securities &
Financial Law: Crisis in Confidence: Self Regulation in the Securities Industry, 10
FORDHAM J. CoRP. FIN. L. 167.
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the Securities Industry Association-Mr. Ketchum among
them-debated the future of self-regulation.
Just this morning, the SEC voted to propose new rules relating to
the governance, independence, and oversight of SROs such as the
NYSE.13  The Commission also voted to issue a concept release
requesting public comment on a variety of issues relating to the efficacy
of the self-regulatory system.'
4
In this environment, the role of the NYSE is subject to new
challenges. No one is better suited to address these challenges than
Richard Ketchum. Mr. Ketchum was formally appointed as Chief
Regulatory Officer of the NYSE on January 8, 2004, and began work on
March 8. As a result of the NYSE's recent governance reforms, Mr.
Ketchum reports to the Board Regulatory Oversight and Regulatory
Budget Committee. 5
Mr. Ketchum came to the NYSE from Citigroup where he served as
General Counsel to the Corporate and Investment Bank and was a
member of the unit's planning group, the Business Practices Committee
and the Risk Management Committee. Prior to Citigroup, he spent
twelve years at the NASD and NASDAQ. He served as President of
NASDAQ for three years and President of the NASD for seven years.
Previously he had served at the SEC for fourteen years, eight of them as
Director of the Division of Market Regulation. Mr. Ketchum earned his
J.D. from the New York University School of Law and his B.A. from
Tufts University.
As Dean Treanor noted, he has been a particularly good friend to
Fordham Law School. In addition to teaching here as an adjunct
professor-and one of our alumni recently told me that his course last
13. SEC Votes to Propose Changes in SRO Governance and Issue Related Concept
Release, SEC Press Release No. 2004-154 (Nov. 9, 2004) available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-154.htm. For the text of the proposed rules see
Proposed Rules for the Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory
Organizations, etc., Exchange Act Release No. 34,50699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126 (Dec. 8,
2004) available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/34-50699.htm.
14. See Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No.
34,50700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,265 (Dec. 8, 2004) available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/34-50700.htm.
15. See NYSE Appoints Richard Ketchum Chief Regulatory Officer, at
http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?displayPage=/content/articles/1075894220122.ht
ml (February 2004).
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year on Selected Topics in Securities Regulation was, I believe these
were her exact words, "unbelievably great"--he recently joined the
Center's Board of Advisors.
Mr. Ketchum has a reputation on Wall Street as a "tough cop." He
has been widely quoted as warning that the NYSE is going to increase
its enforcement efforts and use stiffer financial penalties to address Wall
Street wrongdoing.
Since his arrival at the NYSE, his efforts have been addressed to
sales practices of brokerage firms and potentially manipulative trading
practices. Recently he also assumed responsibility for monitoring listed
company compliance with its changed standards.
The increasing importance of the Exchange's enforcement efforts,
as well as the task of what Business Week calls "restoring the exchange's
credibility, '' 16 at a time when the reputation of Wall Street has been
somewhat battered, call for extraordinary leadership. Responding to that
call, it gives me great pleasure to introduce to you Richard Ketchum.
LECTURE
MR. KETCHUM: Thanks very much, Jill. And thank you as well,
John and Dean Treanor.
It is a pleasure to be here tonight, certainly a pleasure to be here
seeing so many old friends. But mostly it is an enormous honor to give
this lecture tonight because of what Al Sommer stood for-an incredibly
inquisitive mind, always open to new ideas, an absolute commitment to
strong, transparent regulatory standards, and most of all reveling in the
debate of ideas, always striving for the resolution of even fundamental
differences with civility.
But those are mere words. Looking around here, along with a lot of
old friends, I see some colleagues from the Exchange and some students.
I think it is worth taking a moment, particularly with Starr here, to let
you understand something about Al.
Understand that there are many definitions of a giant in securities
regulation or in securities or in the law. Al was unique as a giant. He
was unique as a mentor. He plucked, not one, but literally generations
of SEC people, leaders within the industry, pulled them under his wing,
16. Mara Der Hovanesian, Big Stick at the Big Board (November 15, 2004), at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_46/b3908076_mzO2O.htm.
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exposed them to ideas, exposed them to other leaders and great minds in
the securities law, continually pulled people together to push ideas and
to work through ideas, and reveled not in demonstrating that he was the
smartest person in the world, but rather in people coming together,
thinking things through, and reaching resolution on hard topics. It is a
remarkable gift.
He is a man who was Commissioner at a time, I think, of the golden
years of the SEC and at a time when no one could tell you who the
Republicans were and who the Democrats were, a great statement that I
think has much to say for the legacy of the SEC.
The topic I have chosen tonight also reflects one of the countless
subjects that Al Sommer contributed to, the future of self-regulation. Al
served as an independent director on the board of the NASD not once,
but twice-I think, at least at the time, the first person to have ever done
so--bringing his usual mixture of intelligence, wit, and mediation. He
was in many ways precisely the model of modem, independent, yet
knowledgeable, self-regulation.
The topic of the future of self-regulation seems to be particularly
timely today. In part, it is timely because the SEC decided to put out
two releases, as Professor Fisch indicated and I will not repeat. It was
actually driven into my mind that it was timely, shortly after it was
announced that I was taking my position, when Annette Nazareth first
gave her first speech indicating that there would be a concept release on
self-regulation.' 7 And I realized the timeliness when I walked into my
kitchen and my wife stood there dangling the story, saying, "Tell me, are
we moving out in six months or when?" So that has a way of focusing
the mind on where self-regulation's future really is.
It is also important because obviously, and having lived through
some of this, there have been enormous changes in the nature of both the
securities markets and the securities industry in the last couple decades.
First, the consolidation of the industry, globalization, and the
elimination of Glass Steagall restrictions 8 have resulted in complex
holding company structures overseeing wide-ranging banking and
17. Speech by SEC Staff: Market Structure: 2000 and Beyond, at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch376.htm (May 24, 2000).
18. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.). See also Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, at http://www.sia.com/capitol-hill/html/gramm-leach-bliley-act.html (last
visited Apr. 21, 2005).
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securities activities that by its very nature cannot help but underline the
difference between the federal holding company banking regulation
approach to regulation and the securities functional regulation approach.
Along with it, is the question of where self-regulation fits in, both from a
financial and operational standpoint and from an ethical and sales
practice standpoint, within complex entities that are simply not managed
across regulatory lines.
Second, in part because of these developments, a number of
countries, including the United Kingdom, have shifted away from a self-
regulation model to reposing most authority with a government regulator
with responsibility for all financial and banking activity.
Finally, there have been troubling incidents of self-regulatory
failures to react quickly enough to fraudulent activity in the NASDAQ
market, the NYSE, and apparently the options exchanges as well.
Moreover, neither the SEC nor the SROs can be and are happy regarding
the timeliness of their response to abuses arising out of the financial
firms' inability to manage conflicts with respect to their research and
investment banking functions or the sale of mutual funds.
To properly consider the future of self-regulation it is important to
first recall its origins, which Professor Fisch has already beaten me to
the punch in doing, as well as its perceived strengths, which has allowed
it to maintain such a central role in securities regulation for the last
century.
The current system of cooperative self-regulation by stock
exchanges and the NASD, subject to government oversight by the SEC,
is both historically rooted and legally grounded in the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"). As Jill indicated, long
before the NYSE was known as an SRO it functioned as such,
establishing rules of conduct both for its member brokers and for its
companies.
Indeed, as Jill noted, not only was the Buttonwood Agreement
identified, but as early as 1797 a variety of regulatory requirements were
built in as to how members would deal with each other. Perhaps most
notably, infamously, and long lasting was the establishment of a
procedure of fixed commissions,' 9 which demonstrates one of the
conflicts we will talk about later in self-regulation.
But beyond that, the Exchange continued throughout the 19th
19. See generally Banner supra note 11.
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century both with regard to member regulation and issuer listing
standards, setting standards for the listing of new securities by 1866,
restrictions on watered stock in 1869, and rudimentary financial
disclosure requirements before the turn of the 20th century.20
The Exchange Act, therefore, did not so much invent self-regulation
as embrace it or if you prefer, accept it as a political compromise. The
key feature that it added, a key and critical feature, was oversight by the
SEC.2" This was most colorfully described by Justice Douglas in a
quote that many of you know: "Government playing a residual role.
Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door,
loaded, well-oiled, cleaned, and ready for use but with a hope it would
never have to be used.,
22
SEC oversight has long been deemed critical to address the two
fundamental potential weaknesses of self-regulation: first, the risk of
industry capture, resulting in insufficiently aggressive rule-making and
enforcement activity; and second, the risk of an SRO engaging in
anticompetitive activity to protect the economic interest of the industry
as a whole, such as fixed commissions, or preferring the old school in
some portion of the industry over new competitors.
Over time, and as a result of incidences of perceived SRO failures,
Congress has expanded the SEC's oversight responsibilities,
culminating in the Securities Reform Act of 1975,23 where the SEC was
provided with wide-ranging approval authority over all SRO rules, the
ability to amend those rules,24 and the ability to discipline SROs for
failing to enforce their rules and the securities laws.25
The SRO model with SEC oversight has indeed thrived, albeit with
ups and downs, for seventy years with good reason. For along with the
conflict concerns there are strong and discernible benefits to self-
regulation. In simplest terms, self-regulation offers the benefit of greater
expertise, the ability to leverage government resources, and the ability to
impose non-scienter-based ethical standards that would be inappropriate
to be imposed by a federal government. Finally, self-regulation provides
20. Id. at 120-40.
21. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2004).
22. W. 0. Douglas, Democracy and Finance (Allen, ed. 1940) 82.
23. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2002).
A.A. SOMMER LECTURE: KETCHUM
a means to leverage through industry user fees government resources,
protecting against very meaningful and real periods of budget constraint
and political impact as a result of that.
I could talk a lot more about the benefits of self-regulation, and I
think many of you could elucidate them and discuss them in great detail.
But in some way, as nice as those words are, and as passionately as I
believe that they are correct, I recognize the reaction in some quarters is
somewhat different right now, as evidenced by the SEC releases to some
degree, and perhaps even within the audience, a reaction--politeness,
perhaps-but noted with a belief that self-regulation has gone off the
tracks. That self-regulation is perhaps not sufficiently alert to
developments and conflicts in the marketplace in the securities industry;
and at the same time, contrasting with an industry that has fears of
"regulators on steroids" who are driven by fear of criticism to do
duplicative and intrusive investigations. These investigations are done
with a predilection for zero tolerance and punitive actions in their view
that do not take into account the good-faith compliance efforts of the
industry and the complexity of today's markets and the technological
systems of the firms. This is combined with a lingering view of many in
the securities industry that regulators are not sufficiently knowledgeable
about how things really work and not adequately open to industry views.
And yet, compare this, on the other hand, with the common public
view that regulators are slow, weak, and conflicted, and that the industry
views noncompliance with laws and rules as a cost of doing business,
and you have a general recipe for at least a perception of self-regulation
in crisis.
Now, let me stop to say that is not my view of self-regulation and
that is not my view of how it has performed, certainly not at the NYSE
or anywhere else I have worked at. But I think the breadth in which
some of those views have been held-and that each of you in this room
have at a minimum heard, if not expressed yourself-underlies a need to
step back and ask about where self-regulation goes from here.
A perhaps humorous but symbolic example of how far we as
regulators in the industry have to go is that, as you know and Jill
mentioned, I have recently taken a new job. In taking that new job I was
welcomed back from the dark side.
[Laughter.]
What is interesting is that I was welcomed back from the dark side
twice: once when I arrived at Citigroup, leaving NASDAQ; and again
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when I left Citigroup and came to the NYSE.
It is, therefore, not surprising in this environment that the SEC has
today authorized for publication two releases for public comment, as Jill
noted, the first proposing rules imposing governance and transparency
reporting requirements for SROs, 26 and the second a concept release on
issues relating to self-regulation.27
In such an environment, I believe it is important to pause before we
move forward and try to rearticulate the compact that should form the
foundation of self-regulation. For years, the securities industry thrived
based on a common viewpoint that growth was contingent on investor
confidence, and investor confidence could only be maintained through a
strong, collaborative regulatory partnership. If we are to maintain that
consensus in a more open, consumer-oriented, and cynical world, then it
behooves us all to try to articulate what strong, collaborative regulation
means--or, if you will, what is the self-regulation compact?
First, we must recognize and face the fact that self-regulation
involves three, not two, parties: the SROs, the industry, and investors.
Our collective success is based on investor confidence. Everything we
do, whenever possible, must include the investor's point of view. Their
concerns must be represented by us in every possible decision.
Therefore, what must be the commitments? Let me try to speak
personally from the standpoint of NYSE regulation, without trying to be
pretentious enough to suggest this for other SROs.
First is knowledge. We must make every effort to learn about and
understand our market and how the industry works so that our decisions
are thoughtful and our regulatory requirements take into account costs as
well as benefits. We can not do that alone. Indeed, we have to welcome
the industry's help in training our staff, in providing input, and allowing
us to be able to understand the developments and the pressures that exist
in the securities industry.
We now provide our staff with effective training in the meaning of
SEC and NYSE rules and interpretations, and I have found the level of
their knowledge is extraordinary. But it is a challenge for them to
absorb the constant change occurring in the market and in large,
complex securities firms.
26. See Proposed Rules for the Fair Administration and Governance of Self-
Regulatory Organizations, etc., supra note 13.
27. See Concept Release Concerning Regulation, supra note 14.
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In addition, we need to be thinking about enhancing the dialogue
between us and senior executives at our member firms. We want to
better understand their challenges, their risks, how they are dealing with
conflicts and the competitive pressures that are inherent in the securities
industry.
I know and have heard many concerns raised regarding candid
conversations between NYSE regulation, other regulatory entities, and
the firms and the potential exposure to disciplinary actions. Together we
have to get past that and recognize that if the SROs are to do their job,
effectively identify risk to investors, and effectively contribute to
providing a culture of compliance in the firms, we need to find an ability
to communicate with the firms, being comfortable over the level of
exposure that that communication involves.
Second, transparency. We want input into rule-making, something
that perhaps at the Exchange we have not always been perfect on from
the transparency standpoint. We want our members and member firms
to let us know when our rules are unfair or our interpretations are
problematic.
One step toward that goal will be our effort to revitalize our
regulatory committees, which will require time and commitment on both
sides.
To solicit investor involvement, our new website, launched just this
week--nyse.com/regulation28 for those who would like to see it--has a
prominent new section explaining how investors who feel they have
been subjected to unfair or improper business conduct by a member or a
member organization can file a complaint.
Next year we will move towards launching a significant investor
outreach initiative on top of this. I hope this will include investor town
hall meetings, both over the Web and across the country. I hope through
those forums we can gain a better understanding of the concerns of
investors, both individual and institutional investors.
As I said previously, our collective success is based on investor
confidence. We will not regain that confidence until we reestablish
communications with those who make our industry possible.
The third commitment of the NYSE regulation is independence.
The first priority of the NYSE regulation is protection of the investor. If
28. More information available at
http://www.nyse.com/regulation/inqcomplaints/1088808969148.html.
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that occasionally brings us into conflict with the business side of the
Exchange, then that is all right. There must never be a question in the
eyes of investors that our regulatory decisions are blind to the interests
of the business side of the Exchange.
Similarly, there must never be the slightest doubt by anyone in the
industry that the NYSE's regulatory decisions, whether in an
examination or in an enforcement action, are based on anything but our
best judgment; it is not on whether a particular firm may be competing
with or providing orders to a competitor of the NYSE.
The NYSE governance changes, proposed by Chairman John Reed
and approved by the SEC in December of 2003,29 address this goal
directly. Because of these changes instituted by the NYSE Board, CEO
John Thain, as much as I admire him and admire what he is doing at the
Exchange, is a respected colleague but not a reporting relationship of
mine.
The Chief Regulatory Officer, of which I am the first, reports
directly to the Board, to the Regulatory Committee. The Regulatory
Oversight Committee-or "ROC" as we affectionately call it--has
oversight and accountability for the NYSE's regulatory program. Our
compensation and ultimate success relate solely to our performance as a
regulator, not the success of the market, with the hopes that the market
continues to succeed so that it can pay somebody.
I think this is a particularly important point often missed in the
cynicism with respect to the conflicts of self-regulation. My experience
over the decades of self-regulation is seldom that the people involved do
not care about regulatory goals-in fact, they do. The concern and the
legitimate issue is their focus, and the fact that, as is often-and maybe
even perhaps inevitably--the case, the compelling competitiveness and
investor issues involved in running a market can cause directors to lose
focus on the self-regulatory program.
It is through identifying accountability with respect to the members
of the Board, whether done as an affiliate of the Board in ways that the
NASD has done at different points of its development in the last five
29. See A Conversation with Interim Chairman and CEO John Reed, The Exchange
Vol. 10 No. 10/11 at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/xnlvl On1O-11.pdf (discussing Chairman
Reed's proposed governance changes); see SEC Press Release No. 2003-173 at
http://sec.gov/news/press/2003-173.htm (discussing the SEC's approval of the
governance changes).
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years, or done as a regulatory committee, that I think it is absolutely
critical to the success of self-regulation operating within a marketplace
organization.
Our fourth commitment is to eliminate duplication. Frustrations of
regulatory duplication led to a Securities Industry Association ("SIA")
proposal for a hybrid sole self-regulator.3 ° This is something that I think
is part of the number of strange cites raised in the SEC concept release
today, where markets retain responsibility for surveillance but all
member firm examinations are focused on one single SRO.3 1
The concerns of duplication are real, and in many ways they are
more real than at the time the SIA made that proposal. They are real
today. While some of our efforts have moved both us and the NASD to
try to address those duplication concerns, they relate to the oversight
exam and the firms' ability to ensure that there is a consolidated
oversight exam between the NASD and the NYSE.
They do not relate to the evolution of the SROs' and the SEC's
exam programs in which far more of the examinations related to cause
exams and specials focused on particular issues that often midway can
morph into enforcement investigations. That environment requires a
different level of escalation that cannot be focused entirely on planning.
It requires real-time information between each of the regulators and,
frankly, requires the cooperation and participation of the SEC just as
much as the NASD and the NYSE in successfully addressing it.
But it is worth the effort. While I will not linger on this, I think the
alternative of a single SRO, particularly for an exam program, is a
flawed alternative. It fails to recognize that the efforts of market
surveillance drive an examination program, that the ability to separate
the two creates a lesser degree of knowledge and understanding of the
particular markets that the SROs are responsible for, and it is likely to
result in more burdensome, less knowledgeable regulation, not better.
The fifth commitment of NYSE regulation is that serious violators
will receive stem and effective discipline. We must eliminate the public
perception that regulatory fines that address noncompliance are an
acceptable cost of doing business.
30. Reinventing Self-Regulation-White Paper for the Securities Industry
Association, available at
http://www.sia.com/marketstructure/html/siawhitepaperfinal.htm#_Toc52859676.
31. See Concept Release Concerning Regulation, supra note 14.
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Self-regulation is not about low penalties. It is about the wisdom of
being able to discern differences between a technical and a serious
violation.
We recognize that there is a difference between a firm that has
violated a rule despite a serious commitment to compliance systems and
ethics, and a firm that is a consistent recidivist with insufficient
commitment to compliance. We need to be able to demonstrate that
from the standpoint of our penalties as well. We are beginning to do
that and will continue to do so, hopefully on both sides, not just on the
side of large penalties.
We also need to reduce the time it takes before a serious law
violator is disciplined and, if appropriate, barred from the industry.
Now, let us briefly look at the SRO compact with regard to the
responsibilities of the firms.
First, there must be active participation in the process. That
participation requires a securities firm to represent its customers, not
only its bottom line. I think it is important to reiterate to firms again and
again from a self-regulation standpoint that their voices will always be
given a chance to be heard as long as they address the question of what
is best for their customers, not just for their bottom line.
Second, a commitment to a culture of compliance. I am an optimist
here. I see and have experienced real changes in the securities industry.
The business today I believe generally does understand the cost of
noncompliance and cares genuinely about trying to develop an ethic and
culture to eliminate that.
The challenge is that it is not enough to try; you have to get good at
it. In the complex securities environments, one of which I lived in, that
is not an easy challenge at all.
Firms have to recognize that their legal and compliance staffs are
their lifeline to building that compliance foundation. Access to senior
management must be regular and unconditional. Firms must get better
at assessing their compliance risks. In particular, they must capitalize on
the self-assessments required by Sarbanes-Oxley 32 and FDICIA 3 and
make those regulatory reviews matter, not something that is instinctively
32. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Sarbanes Oxley self assessment and internal controls
requirement of management).
33. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 12 U.S.C. §
1831 m.
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part of a broker-dealer's culture. A broker-dealer's culture from its very
bones is outstanding at being able to fight fires and respond to
opportunities. It is not very good at intellectually stepping back and
evaluating how they have done and where their risks and exposures are.
After having served as General Counsel of Citigroup's investment
bank, I understand that major firms have substantially improved their
processes to review new and proposed transactions. However, I have
also noticed that some firms tend to take their eye off the ball when
looking at ongoing businesses that may be under new profit pressures or
growing dramatically. Firms need to emphasize again and again the
importance of escalation to traders and operations people for whom
consideration of a culture of compliance is far from natural.
There is a need to push hard at technology risks, including flaws in
regulatory reporting, changes in e-mail supervision demands, and
capacity issues. These concerns must be identified and escalated. A
proper self-regulation will remind firms to constantly look at this area
and constantly examine the investment in and attention to technology
areas.
Third, forthright relationships. Firms need to report improper and
illegal conduct when it has occurred and when it is discovered. Now,
part of that just comes from our rules, which require firms to raise their
hands and self-report problems.34 That, while we recognize and respect
firms that swiftly do that, is not all that I would suggest is involved in a
forthright relationship with respect to regulatory compliance.
An example of this comes as follows. I understand the need for
internal investigations with respect to complex brokerage firms and
understand that firms may often reach conclusions in good faith on
legality that we or other regulators differ. But if we commence an
investigation, it is just not okay to fail to bring to our attention troubling
parts of the firm's investigation, no matter what your legality conclusion
might be.
My talk today is not intended to even begin to be a complete list of
all that must be done, but instead a beginning. Self-regulation at its best
requires the participation of us all--the industry, the SROs, the
investors, and even the SEC--but I believe it is an effort worth making,
one that allows us never to forget that our collective success is based on
34. See New York Stock Exchange Rules 440g-440h available at
http://rules.nyse.com/NYSE/NYSERules/.
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investor confidence. I believe that together we can move past some of
the bitter disappointments of the moment to breathe new life into a self-
regulatory system that has, since it was created in the 1930s, made the
U.S. securities industry the envy of the world.
With that, I thank you and I would love to have questions.
[Applause]
QUESTION: You mentioned changes in e-mail supervision in a
technological way. Can you give us a little more insight into that?
MR. KETCHUM: Well, I think there are two different challenges
with respect to e-mail. One, which all corporations, including the
NYSE, are struggling with, is from the standpoint of retention. I think
on the whole the securities industry is getting a handle on that.
I guess the piece on the e-mail side that I would focus people's
attention and thinking on today, and that is an area that we are talking
about with our Compliance Committee and is a concern of ours, is the
obligation and the efforts to meet the supervisory review requirements
with respect to salespersons' communications. As all of us live in the e-
mail world and deal with steady incursions, yet each quarter-generation
there is increased facility and dependence on electronic
communications, I think we all are regularly, if not continually,
overburdened and overwhelmed by the level of e-mail that we have to
review. That is clearly true for your managers to the extent that you
advise or are involved in a securities firm as well.
What we were seeing with a variety of firms is attempts to triage
that in one way or another and recognize that it would be a good idea to
find ways, either through technology or throwing additional bodies at it,
to do the type of issue spotting that you do once you are being
investigated while you are outside of that investigation from a
compliance standpoint. As I said, we were seeing that being done in a
variety of securities firms.
It is not part of the regulatory requirements, but I think we
recognize how difficult the basic review requirements that are in
Exchange rules are today, and we are trying to look at the right ways to
be able to move forward with the industry on some at least Best Practice
standards.
QUESTION: Rick, staying on the e-mail, a number of clients have
told me that they produce approximately a million e-mails a day. I
think, if you go back to the original rule, it would be like paper mail, and
a manager could review every one of them, which is clearly not possible.
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You would have to have some sort of smart system for review. Is there
any thought to rethinking the basic regulatory approach to e-mail
review?
MR. KETCHUM: That is why we have a Compliance Committee to
help advise us on that, Bob. But I think it is a valid point. It has not
changed the rules that are in place now, which do not impose absolute
requirements to review all e-mail but do expect a substantial sample to
be reviewed by the managers, and we are going to continue to expect
that.
The question is: how does a firm recognize the burdens that may be
placed, at least on some of your managers, and come up with a better
approach to it? I think the answer is we are interested in ways that firms
can do that. In fact, we would encourage firms to think creatively on
that, because we recognize that the burdens of the rule may simply be
placing impossible, or at least difficult, burdens on some managers.
The challenge is not to just say, "Man, this is just impossible, it is
ridiculous." The challenge is then to question: "Okay, what next?" That
is the question we would love to see the industry start to ask.
QUESTION: Toward the end of your remarks you made the point
about responsibilities of firms to not just share only the good parts of
their investigation. Were you making the limited point that you cannot
pick and choose your sword and shield, or were you making a point
towards privilege?
MR. KETCHUM: No, I am not making a point towards privilege,
but I am saying that in situations where you self-report and where the
regulator follows up and is focused clearly on the subject matter in
which your investigation has identified some troubling facts, even if you
concluded that those facts do not raise legality, at some point where the
interest of the Exchange or the interest of any regulator is focused on
that standpoint, without arguing privilege or the rest, you should not be
surprised that we will not be amused if the firm in that situation does not
forthrightly indicate in pretty clear indication the sum of what they
found in their investigation.
And again, that will be your choice, but in those circumstances
where you are outside and making a conclusion and where we have
determined it is an area of concern, I think a little bit more than just the
fact of self-reporting would be a good thing.
QUESTION: Don't you have to link the self-reporting issue that
you just addressed with your earlier comment about distinguishing on
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sanctions between major sanctions--these are my words, not
yours-and less significant ones?
MR. KETCHUM: They are close to my words. I am sure I am
going to hear them back at some point.
Yes, I think we do. As I say, I see enormously praiseworthy
cultures in some securities firms in which we hear quickly when they
identify problems and where their summaries of those problems are
broad and forthcoming.
That alone to me is not the end of the question. The question is:
"Well, how have those firms done from a compliance effort, what is
their commitment from a compliance effort standpoint, have we seen
problems in literally the same area before with respect to the firm?" and
a variety of other things. And you know the type of things that people
consider in sanctions and have read all the speeches and releases from
the SEC, so I do not need to go into any great detail there. So we look at
a lot.
But I know, particularly in this time of what some might perceive as
somewhat escalating sanctions, it is difficult to perceive the difference.
I can guarantee you-and it is a conversation we have regularly in the
Enforcement Division in the Exchange, and which Susan Merrill35 is
very focused on-there are distinctions and each of those issues are
considered with respect to the sanctions. We are not just looking at
historical precedents; we are trying to evaluate exactly that type of issue.
We do not live in a banking culture, for better or worse. We live in
a culture that is fundamentally consumerist, where there is an
expectation that enforcement is an important part of encouraging
compliance. Even great firms will receive and be the subject of
enforcement actions sometimes.
But I absolutely agree with you that an organization that is not
looking at exactly those points is not doing its job, and we are
committed to look at those points.
Brian? Another great ex-NASD Regulation Board member.
QUESTION: Well, I was going to ask a question that sort of relates
to that. I am trying to understand the new organization that you head
and your role. How do you contrast-because you know Mary
Schapiro's job--how do you contrast your structure and your
organization with the one that we are a little more familiar with, and that
35. Susan L. Merrill is Executive Vice President of Enforcement at the NYSE.
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is NASD regulation?
MR. KETCHUM: I think the NYSE operates very similar to the
way that Mary Schapiro operated, except for the reporting relationship,
which is cleaner at the Exchange than it was at the NASD in the first
three years after Mary came there and before the private placement in
NASDAQ. The NASD operated with an affiliated NASD Regulation
Board that effectively, with the oversight of the Holding Company
Board, or the Association Board, the NASD Board, effectively had the
accountability for the regulatory program and the oversight.
The Regulatory Committee acts as that NASD Regulatory Board
prior to the spinning off of NASDAQ. I think it works remarkably
similar vis-a-vis Mary's relationship with Frank Zarb3 6 and my
relationship with John Thain,37 albeit the major difference being that
Mary did still report to Frank Zarb and I do not.
With that, it seems to be time for refreshments. Thank you very
much.
36. Frank Zarb is a former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the NASD.
37. John A. Thain is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the NYSE.
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